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ABSTRACT: The California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI) is a commonly used tool
for measuring critical thinking dispositions. However, research on the efficacy of the CCTDI in
predicting good thinking about students’ own deeply held beliefs is scant. In this paper we report on
preliminary results from our ongoing study designed to gauge the usefulness of the CCTDI in this
context.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The main goal of general critical thinking instruction is the promotion of ‘transfer’:
improvement in quality of reasoning on topics not dealt with directly in the critical
thinking class, and in situations other than the critical thinking classroom. One
target area for transfer that is commonly discussed in the literature is students’
thinking about their own deeply held beliefs. Promoting transfer in this area is
recognized as particularly difficult both because of the special relationship between
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-13.
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the thinker and the object of thought, and because selective application of critical
thinking skills can improve students’ ability to defend their beliefs from criticism as
well as attack incongruent beliefs (Paul, 1992, p. 136; 1993, pp. 57-8, 137-8, 206-7,
329-30).
One of the keys to the success of a critical thinking intervention is its ability
to impart the will to think critically, over and above the ability to do so – that is, a
general disposition to think critically when critical thinking is called for. Once a
student decides to think critically about a topic, additional more specific critical
thinking dispositions come into play. The disposition to evaluate one’s own and
alternative views by the same standards and the disposition to persevere through a
prolonged or difficult thinking process, amongst others, determine the quality of
students’ thinking once it has been switched on. Because of the especially
problematic nature of thinking that is focused on students’ own deeply held beliefs
and the importance of such beliefs in determining how students behave and interact
with others in the wider world, the disposition to think about such beliefs critically,
and attendant dispositions that support good thinking, are particularly important
both to promote and, ipso facto, to measure.
One of the tools that is most commonly used to measure critical thinking
dispositions in research is the California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory
(CCTDI). However, research on the efficacy of the CCTDI in predicting good thinking
about students’ own deeply held beliefs is scant. The main aim of the current study
is to gauge the usefulness of the CCTDI in measuring the quality of students’
thinking about their own deeply held beliefs. This is done through comparison of
CCTDI results with results from two other measures, the Revised Paranormal Belief
Scale (RPBS) and a semi-structured interview. The outcome is important for a
further study we hope to undertake that will compare alternative methods of
delivery of the general critical thinking course to see which is most successful in
promoting the transfer of critical thinking skills to the students’ thinking about their
own deeply held beliefs. This future study will require us to measure the quality of
students’ thinking about these beliefs; hence our interest in determining what is a
good way to measure it. Should it turn out that in fact the Revised Paranormal Belief
Scale performs better (as judged against interviews with participants scored for
strong sense critical thinking by experienced critical thinking teachers) than the
CCTDI, that will be a useful result for us, since the RPBS is free, quick to administer,
and can be easily modified, unlike the CCTDI.
For the purposes of this research, deeply held controversial beliefs will be
understood as ethical, epistemological, or ontological beliefs that are important to
the participant and that are controversial in the sense that many educated and
intelligent people disagree with regard to their truth. Claims like “Jesus is divine,”
“People who vote for Labour don’t know anything about politics,” and “Eating meat
is moral” would be examples provided they were sufficiently important to the
participant. The participant need not be aware of holding such beliefs so long as it
can be shown that she behaves as if she does. Strong sense critical thinking will be
understood as critical thinking that is applied to one’s own beliefs as well as it is
applied to those of one’s “opponents”: it is critical thinking that is not biased in favor
of one’s own beliefs (Paul, 1993, pp. 137-8).
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One of our hypotheses is that lack of strong sense critical thinking is
indicated by the presence of any one strongly or deeply held belief which is
pseudoscientific or anti-scientific, or which lacks good scientific backing even
though it is a belief that could reasonably be expected to have such backing if it were
true. The RPBS is a rough and ready survey of seven popular kinds of beliefs of this
sort. We hypothesised that there would be a correlation between highest score on
the RPBS (indicating a high degree of belief in some statement of this sort) and low
scores for strong sense critical thinking (as measured by scored interviews). A
second hypothesis was that CCTDI results would not correlate so well with strong
sense critical thinking, because the CCTDI appears to measure test-takers’ opinions
about their own critical thinking dispositions rather than the dispositions
themselves, and there is reason to think that judgments about one’s own virtues and
abilities tend to be more positive than is justified.
2. METHOD
All participants completed an introductory level one-semester course in critical
thinking between 2010 and 2012 at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. In all,
fifty seven people chose to participate. Participants were given two movie vouchers
as compensation for their efforts. Data from all participants was of sufficient quality
to be included in the analysis. At this initial stage no demographic data was
collected.
Data was collected using two paper and pencil questionnaires and a semistructured interview. The first questionnaire given was the Revised Paranormal
Belief Scale (RPBS, Tobacyk, 2004). This is a standardized measure of degree of
belief in each of seven kinds of “paranormal” beliefs: Traditional Religious Belief, Psi,
Witchcraft, Superstition, Spiritualism, Extraordinary Life Forms, and Precognition. It
is comprised of 26 statements (e.g. statement 7: Astrology is a way to accurately
predict the future). Participants indicate the strength of their
agreement/disagreement with each statement on a seven-level Likert-like rating
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Scores for each kind of belief are
calculated by averaging the scores for three to four related statements. Mean RPBS
and High RPBS were also calculated, the latter being the highest degree of belief in
any one of the seven categories scored by each participant.
After completing the RPBS participants were given thirty minutes to
complete the California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI). This is an
internationally recognized standardized critical thinking dispositions test. It is
comprised of 75 statements. Test-takers indicate the strength of their
agreement/disagreement on a six-level Likert-like rating scale. The questionnaires
were machine scored by Insight Assessment who own and distribute the CCTDI.
Insight Assessment reported back to the researchers. Every participant was given a
score for each of the following characteristics: truth-seeking, open-mindedness,
inquisitiveness, analyticity, systematicity, confidence in reasoning, and maturity of
judgment. They were also given a total score said to measure a general disposition
towards critical thinking. Low CCTDI was also calculated by the researchers. Low
CCTDI gives each participant’s lowest CCTDI score. CCTDI scores of forty to fifty are
3
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considered to be positive, and scores of fifty to sixty are considered to be high
(Facione and Facione, 2010, p. 20).
After taking the CCTDI participants were interviewed by one of the
researchers. The interview normally took twenty to thirty minutes and was divided
into three parts, each geared towards answering a different question (interview
questions one to three). First, participants were asked if the critical thinking course
had any influence on the quality of their thinking. Second, participants were asked if
the critical thinking course had any influence on the quality of their thinking about
their own deeply held but controversial beliefs. The meaning of “deeply held
controversial beliefs” was explained to participants briefly in a way that is
consistent with but is not necessarily as detailed as the definition given above (see
introduction). Both these questions were later scored by each of the researchers
scoring independently on a seven-level Likert-like rating scale (1 = very negative, 7
= very positive). If a participants’ answer was not sufficiently clear he or she was
explicitly asked to rate changes on this scale.
In the third part of the interview participants were asked to discuss one, two,
or three claims that are likely to be controversial beliefs of importance to the
participant. The aim was to discuss two claims, but sometimes one provided
sufficient telling responses, and at other times two claims still failed to elicit enough
responses; hence the variability in the number of claims. The first claim is typically
chosen from a belief rated seven in the RPBS, and the second one was typically “it is
morally okay to eat meat.” Participants were first asked to give the reasoning behind
their beliefs. They were then confronted with counterarguments given by the
interviewer, and asked to volunteer their thoughts again. The process was normally
repeated twice, or three or more times if only one claim was discussed. To help elicit
the needed data participants were also asked questions like these:
 What are your thoughts about X?
 Why do you think that X is true/false?
 Suppose you met someone who had different beliefs about X, because
they think that Y or Z. How do you think you might respond to them
about this issue?
 Has this discussion changed your view about X?
 In the light of this discussion, do you think that in the days and weeks
following the interview you will think about X further, and perhaps try
to find out more information about the topic?
Using recordings of the interviews and a rating guide, the behavior of each
participant was rated on a seven-level Likert-like rating scale for its conformity with
the following claim: The participant displays strong sense critical thinking about
his/her own deeply held controversial beliefs (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly
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agree). The guide included definitions of strong sense critical thinking, non-critical
thinking, and weak sense critical thinking, as well as lists of typical behaviors
indicative of these (see appendix). (Data from one rater is at the moment of writing
incomplete, and so is not included in the analysis below.)
3. RESULTS
Scoring of question one and two of the interview by the two raters for whom all the
data is available (JK and IG) displayed sufficient inter-rater reliability (question one
r(57) = .826, p = .001, question two r(57) = .815, p = .001). The scoring of question
three showed considerable correlation (r(57) = .608, p = .001) but not sufficiently
high for inter-rater reliability, assuming r = .8 as threshold (see table 1).
Three RPBS items were found to have correlations with SSCT (question three,
interview). Traditional Religious Belief correlated negatively with SSCT for one rater
and the mean of both raters (scored by IG, r(57) = - .339, p = .010, mean of IG & JK
scores, r(57) = - .320, p = .015). Mean RPBS correlated negatively with SSCT for the
mean of IG & JK scores (r(57) = - .269, p = .043). High RPBS correlated negatively
with SSCT for both raters and the mean of IG & JK scores (scored by IG, r(57) = - .297,
p = .025, scored by JK, r(57) = - .298, p = .024, mean of IG & JK scores, r(57) = - .330,
p = .012, see table 2).
Several correlations were found between the CCTDI and SSCT (question
three, interview). Truth-seeking correlated positively with SSCT for JK and the mean
of IG & JK scores (scored by JK, r(57) = .360, p = .006, mean of IG & JK scores, r(57)
= .279, p = .035). Open-mindedness correlated positively with SSCT for both raters
and the mean of IG & JK scores (scored by IG, r(57) = .294, p = .026, scored by JK,
r(57) = .288, p = .030, mean of IG & JK scores, r(57) = .323, p = .014). Inquisitiveness
correlated positively with SSCT for one rater and the mean of IG & JK scores (scored
by JK, r(57) = .501, p = .001, mean of IG & JK scores, r(57) = .445, p = .001).
Analyticity correlated positively with SSCT for one rater (scored by JK, r(57) = .284,
p = .032). Confidence in reasoning correlated positively with SSCT for one rater
(scored by JK, r(57) = .265, p = .046). Total CCTDI correlated positively with SSCT
for one rater and the mean of IG & JK scores (scored by JK, r(57) = .446, p = .001,
mean of IG & JK scores, r(57) = .362, p = .006). Low CCTDI correlated positively with
SSCT for one rater (scored by JK, r(57) = .328, p = .013, see table 3).
Numerous positive correlations were also found between the interview items,
indicating that a higher rating of the positive influence of the CT course on one’s
thinking in general as well as one’s thinking on one’s own deeply held but
controversial beliefs predicted higher SSCT scores (see tables 4 and 5).
CCTDI means are either in the positive range, or in the case of truth-seeking
and systematicity, very close to it. In comparison, the mean for High RPBS (a
participant’s most strongly held RPBS category) favours paranormal belief, and the
means for SSCT are quite low, indicating widespread deficiency in strong sense
critical thinking (see table 6).
Means for question one of the interview (improvement in thinking attributed
by the participant to the critical thinking course) show perception of medium to
small improvement. Means for question two of the interview (improvement in
5
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thinking about one’s own deeply held but controversial beliefs attributed by the
participant to the critical thinking course) all show perception of small to no
improvement (see table 7).
4. DISCUSSION
At this stage of the research data from only two interview raters is available. Scores
for these raters for all three interview questions show strong positive correlations.
Crucially, however, the correlation coefficient for question three was lower than 0.8.
It was hoped that question three of the interview would be the most accurate
measure of participants’ strong sense critical thinking, acting as a standard with
which to evaluate the suitability of the CCTDI and the RPBS for future research. In
some cases the scores of the two raters diverge considerably (e.g. one rater scores
the participant’s behavior as 5, or mostly strong sense critical thinking, while the
other rater scores a 1, or no strong sense critical thinking). Without speculating on
the effect of the data from the third rater on this correlation, these divergent cases
call for qualitative analysis. We hope that such analysis will help us locate the causes
of our disagreements and suggest changes to our method.
Still, in most cases scores for SSCT were more or less in line with each other,
suggesting to us that we are, at the very least, on the right track. Also, until
qualitative analysis is carried out, it is possible that the divergences are due to one
rater not following the rating criteria sufficiently well. Because of both of these
reasons, and because of the preliminary nature of this research, we believe that
there is still some insight to be gained from comparing results from question three
of the interview with results from the RPBS and the CCTDI.
Of the three correlations between RPBS and SSCT (question three, interview),
only High RPBS correlated negatively with SSCT scores from both raters. One of our
hypotheses was that any one strongly or deeply held non-scientific, pseudoscientific,
or anti-scientific belief indicates lack of strong sense critical thinking. The RPBS is a
rough and ready survey of seven popular kinds of beliefs of this sort. High RPBS
gives the highest score for each participant, that is, a participant’s highest level of
belief in any of the seven RPBS items. The modest negative correlations found
support our hypothesis somewhat.
Of the CCTDI items that correlated with SSCT (question three, interview)
most were due to the scoring of a single rater (JK). Only Open-mindedness
correlated positively for both raters. The number of correlations does suggest that
the CCTDI has some predictive power with respect to strong sense critical thinking,
but in absolute terms High RPBS came much closer to the raters’ judgments than
any CCTDI item. Mean CCTDI scores are by and large positive, while results for SSCT
are quite poor with many participants displaying very little if any strong sense
critical thinking behaviors. High RPBS results lie somewhere in between. A look at
the five top RPBS and CCTDI scorers shows that good results in these instruments
does not predict a good result in SSCT (see tables 8 and 9). Curiously, the numerous
positive correlations found between interview items mean that simply asking
participants if they think the critical thinking course had a good influence on their
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thinking in general, or their thinking about their own deeply held but controversial
beliefs in particular, could have as much predictive power for SSCT as the CCTDI.
Since the researchers also teach the critical thinking course, we are pleased
with the results of question one of the interview. Whether the students are right in
thinking that the course has improved their critical thinking skills is a further
question. Nevertheless, a mean of medium to small improvement in thinking
attributed by the participants to the course is definitely not bad. Results for question
two of the interview – a mean of small to no improvement in thinking about one’s
own deeply held but controversial beliefs attributed by the participant to the course
– are more in line with results for SSCT. Most of the participants flatly denied
changing any of their beliefs following the course or applying their newly learned
skills to their own deeply held beliefs. Several participants who claimed the course
improved their thinking also made it clear that the improvement was mainly one of
putting their own arguments more forcefully, of supporting their own previously
held beliefs with stronger grounds, and of finding out the weaknesses of others’
arguments more easily (we hope to report on exact numbers for these once
qualitative analysis of the interviews is complete). This is in line with our hypothesis
that the critical thinking course can improve students’ dexterity with certain critical
thinking skills while at the same time increasing the probability that they will use
their newly acquired skills one-sidedly, to defend their own previously held beliefs
and attack the beliefs of others.
Once data collection and analysis is complete we aim to report on T-tests
between students who took the course in 2010 or 2011, and students who took the
course in 2012; correlations between the CCTDI and the RPBS; regression analysis
and correlations internal to the CCTDI and RPBS; possible changes to the RPBS to
make it more suitable to our very specific needs; inter-rater reliability and
correlations with the data from the third interview rater; and likely causes of
conspicuous divergent results, including divergent SSCT scores.
With regard to the latter, we are already considering some hypotheses,
feedback on which would be most welcome. (1) Is the scoring guide (see appendix)
sufficiently clear or comprehensive? Some of the “behaviors” listed in the guide are
not obvious behaviors, and some are not behaviors at all. Nevertheless, they seemed
to us to embody important differences between strong sense critical thinking and its
counterfeits, differences that we had to rely on to some extent in our scoring. It was
hoped that educated guesses based on cues available in more overt behavior would
suffice for consistent scoring. (2) What effect did the worldviews of the different
raters have? Can the discrepancies be traced back to different views on the morality
of eating meat (the most commonly discussed issue in the third part of the
interviews)? We commonly see students’ judgments about the quality of particular
instances of reasoning, or the character of other students, being inappropriately
influenced by prior beliefs. Being teachers of critical thinking does not put us above
suspicion. (3) Is it our understanding and/or use of the concept of deeply held belief
that is at fault? One rater (JK) was initially concerned that not all of the topics
discussed in the interviews were in fact deeply held beliefs of the participants in
question: this was particularly of concern in cases where the participants didn't
check 6 or 7 (where 7 is "strongly agree") for any of the items in the RPBS, didn't
7
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volunteer any deeply held beliefs when asked to, and responded without much
enthusiasm to the interviewer's question (having already ascertained that the
participant was a meat-eater) "Do you strongly feel that it is your right to eat meat?"
or "Do you strongly feel that meat-eating is morally okay?" If the claims discussed in
the interview were not deeply held beliefs of the participant, then it would not be
possible to rate the participant's strong sense critical thinking about their deeply
held beliefs on the basis of the interview. However, we think that this was not in fact
a source of difference between raters. In the initial (and currently only) round of
scoring, JK scored the participants for SSCT on the assumption that the beliefs in
question were in fact deeply held beliefs, registering her doubts about this
assumption in some cases for later investigation. The view that deeply held beliefs
are better revealed by people's practices (e.g. regularly eating meat) than by what
they say seems defensible, though it is not uncontroversial. We hope to discuss this
issue further in later work.
A second issue concerning the notion of deeply held belief is worth
mentioning here, though it does not explain rating differences in the present data.
The third rater, whose results are not included in the current data set, suggests that
religious beliefs may not be suitable examples of deeply held belief in this context;
since many of the interviews did discuss religious matters, although none of them
discussed only religious matters, this may, when the data is in, cause there to be a
difference between TB's ratings for SSCT and those of IG and JK. The thought is that
religious and spiritual matters may not be the kinds of things about which people
can reason with any real effectiveness. They might be considered not to be beliefs at
all, but rather ways of being. (It is an interesting question whether or not this view is
opposed to the suggestion in the previous paragraph that one can read people's
beliefs off their behavior even if they do not admit to having those beliefs when
questioned). Or they might be considered to be beliefs which by their very nature
are held as a matter of faith, rather than reason. Some of the participants were quite
explicit about the fact that they were not open to revising their religious beliefs in
response to argument because they didn't think any arguments could be relevant;
their belief was a matter of faith. In contrast, no participants talked like this about
their beliefs in astrology or in psychic powers. Again, we hope to discuss these
issues further in subsequent work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: Thanks to Nicola Starkey for her help with interpreting the
data and to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Waikato for
funding this research.
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APPENDIX: EXCERPTS FROM THE INTERVIEW SCORING GUIDE
Strong sense critical thinking is displayed in behaviors like these:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Seriously considering opposing arguments when confronted with them.
Recognising and internalizing the import of opposing arguments when confronted with them.
Showing genuine interest in opposing arguments or evidence.
Questioning the perspectives, beliefs, and inferences one is personally invested in.
Sympathetically and accurately paraphrasing opposing arguments in a genuine attempt to
recognize their strengths and significance.
Reasoning from within opposing perspectives in a genuine attempt to recognize their
strengths and significance, as well as the limitations of one’s own perspective.
Showing a genuine interest in basing one’s beliefs on the best available evidence.
Showing a genuine interest in seeking opposing evidence.

Weak sense critical thinking and non-critical thinking are the opposite of strong sense critical
thinking and are displayed in behaviors such as these:
1.

Paying lip-service to the import of opposing arguments when confronted with them as a
rhetorical device, or a prelude to counter-attack.
2. Lack of interest in opposing arguments or evidence. Lack of inclination to investigate
opposing arguments or evidence further. Passing the burden of proof to one’s opponents.
Thinking that it is reasonable to keep one’s deeply held controversial belief until one’s
opponents supply incontrovertible evidence or proof.
3. Questioning only perspectives, beliefs, and inferences one is not personally invested in, or
beliefs and inferences that are contrary or contradictory to those one is personally invested
in.
4. Application of the skills taught in the critical thinking course to arguments opposing one’s
views more than to one’s own reasoning.
5. Refusal to reason from within opposing perspectives.
6. Criticising opposing evidence unfairly.
7. Judging the quality of the evidence based on its agreement with one’s beliefs.
8. Repeatedly and only defending one’s own beliefs and attacking the opposition.
9. An admission that no arguments will ever be good enough to elicit change of belief.
10. Shielding one’s beliefs from criticism by claiming that everyone has a right to their own
beliefs.
Although we don’t test for argument analysis and fallacy identification skills in this research, poor –
and only poor – argument analysis and fallacy identification skills are relevant to scoring the third
scale of the interview. The reason for this is our use of Richard Paul’s three-way distinction between
strong sense critical thinking, weak sense critical thinking, and unskilled or non-critical thinking. Low
dexterity with or use of argument analysis and fallacy identification skills counts against strong sense
critical thinking because strong sense critical thinking is skilled thinking. But high dexterity with or
correct and common use of argument analysis and fallacy identification skills does not count in
favour of strong sense critical thinking because weak sense critical thinking can be just as skilled as
strong sense critical thinking. It’s just that in weak sense critical thinking, skills are applied
apologetically rather than fairmindedly.
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TABLES
Table 1
Interview Inter-rater Reliability JK and IG
Q1IG Q2IG
Q1JK
Q2JK
Q3JK

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

.826
.001
.354
.007
.355
.007

.295
.026
.815
.001
.362
.006

Q3IG
.317
.016
.101
.455
.608
.001

Table 2
Correlations between RPBS and SSCT (Interview Question Three)
Q3Mean Q3JK
Traditional
Belief

Religious

Psi
Witchcraft
Superstition
Spiritualism
Extraordinary Life Forms
Precognition
Mean RPBS
High RPBS

Q3IG

Pearson Correlation

-.320

-.255

-.339

Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

.015
-.217
.105
-.212
.113
-.200
.135
-.126
.351
-.041
.761
-.219
.101
-.269
.043
-.330
.012

.056
-.163
.227
-.158
.241
-.204
.127
-.112
.405
-.095
.480
-.229
.087
-.235
.078
-.298
.024

.010
-.244
.067
-.241
.071
-.145
.283
-.115
.396
.050
.713
-.151
.262
-.253
.057
-.297
.025
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Table 3
Correlations between CCTDI and SSCT (Interview Question Three)
Q3Mean Q3JK
Truth-seeking
Open-mindedness
Inquisitiveness
Analyticity
Systematicity
Confidence in
Reasoning
Maturity of Judgment
Total CCTDI
Lowest CCTDI

Q3IG

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation

.279
.035
.323
.014
.445
.001
.242
.070
-.001
.997
.155

.360
.006
.288
.030
.501
.001
.284
.032
.058
.669
.265

.091
.500
.294
.026
.252
.059
.120
.376
-.088
.517
-.047

Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

.249
.150
.266
.362
.006
.237
.076

.046
.188
.162
.446
.001
.328
.013

.726
.056
.678
.147
.274
.043
.749

Q3JK
.264
.047
.300
.023
1

Q1IG
.826
.001
.354
.007
.355
.007
1

Table 4
Correlations within Interview Items A
Q1JK
Q2JK
Q3JK
Q1IG
Q2IG
Q3IG
Q1Mean
Q2Mean
Q3Mean

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

Q1JK
1
.220
.100
.264
.047
.826
.001
.295
.026
.317
.016
.949
.001
.271
.042
.316
.016

Q2JK
.220
.100
1
.300
.023
.354
.007
.815
.001
.101
.455
.305
.021
.951
.001
.244
.067
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.355
.007
.362
.006
.608
.001
.327
.013
.348
.008
.935
.001

.516
.001
.384
.003
.962
.001
.458
.001
.407
.002

Q2IG
.295
.026
.815
.001
.362
.006
.516
.001
1
.153
.256
.432
.001
.954
.001
.308
.020

Q3IG
.317
.016
.101
.455
.608
.001
.384
.003
.153
.256
1
.369
.005
.134
.321
.850
.001

ILAN GOLDBERG ET AL.
Table 5
Correlations within Interview Items B
Q1Mean
Q1JK
Q2JK
Q3JK
Q1IG
Q2IG
Q3IG
Q1Mean
Q2Mean
Q3Mean

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

.949
.001
.305
.021
.327
.013
.962
.001
.432
.001
.369
.005
1
.388
.003
.382
.003

Q2Mean

Q3Mean

.271
.042
.951
.001
.348
.008
.458
.001
.954
.001
.134
.321
.388
.003
1

.316
.016
.244
.067
.935
.001
.407
.002
.308
.020
.850
.001
.382
.003
.291
.028
1

.291
.028

Table 6
High RPBS, CCTDI, and Interview Means
Mean Std.
Deviation
High RPBS
4.65
1.93
Truth-seeking
38.00
5.57
Open-mindedness
43.82
5.74
Inquisitiveness
49.05
5.49
Analyticity
45.49
5.32
Systematicity
39.84
5.87
Confidence
in 44.75
6.06
Reasoning
Maturity of Judgment
45.70
6.05
Q3JK
2.44
1.31
Q3IG
1.63
.87
Q3Mean
2.03
.98
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Table 7
Means for Interview Questions One and Two
Mean Std.
Deviation
Q1JK
5.81
.76
Q2JK
4.79
.92
Q1IG
5.84
.88
Q2IG
4.91
.95
Q1Mean
5.82
.78
Q2Mean
4.85
.89
Table 8
Best Five Mean CCTDI with SSCT (Interview Question Three) Scores
ID
Mean CCTDI Q3JK Q3IG Q3Mean
47
33
40
1
38

51.14
50.57
49.85
49.42
48.57

4
4
5
2
5

2
3
1
1
2

3
3.5
3
1.5
3.5

Table 9
Best Five High RPBS with SSCT (Interview Question Three) Scores
ID High RPBS Q3JK Q3IG Q3Mean
8
27
41
47
15

1
1
1
1.25
1.75

2
5
2
4
2

2
2
1
2
1

2
3.5
1.5
3
1.5
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